

Research Cybersecurity Insights for 2022

Jim Basney
Director, Trusted CI

EDUCAUSE Annual Conference
October 2022



Trusted CI: The NSF Cybersecurity Center of Excellence

Our mission: to lead in the development of an NSF Cybersecurity Ecosystem with the workforce, knowledge, processes, and cyberinfrastructure that enables trustworthy science and NSF's vision of a nation that is a global leader in research and innovation.



<https://trustedci.org/>



Trusted CI Impacts Report


March 2022
For Public Distribution

Jeannette Dopheide¹, John Zage², Jim Basney³


¹ jdopheid@illinois.edu
² jzage@illinois.edu
³ jbasney@illinois.edu

Dopheide, Jeannette, Zage, John, & Basney, Jim.
 (2022). Trusted CI Impacts Report. Zenodo.
doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.6374207

Engagements, by Year and Directorate




Summit Impact by Year




What is Cyberinfrastructure (CI)?

“The comprehensive infrastructure needed to capitalize on dramatic advances in information technology has been termed cyberinfrastructure (CI). Cyberinfrastructure integrates hardware for computing, data and networks, digitally-enabled sensors, observatories and experimental facilities, and an interoperable suite of software and middleware services and tools. ”

-NSF Cyberinfrastructure Vision for 21st Century Discovery



NSF BY THE NUMBERS



NSF Cyberinfrastructure

- Major Facilities / Large Facilities
- Mid-scale Facilities
- ACCESS Resource Providers
- Campus Cyberinfrastructure (CC*)
- Software & Services (CICI, CSSI, etc.)
- People & Expertise (CyberTraining)

NSF Major Facilities (examples)

Facility	Managing Institution(s)
Arecibo Observatory	University of Central Florida
Academic Research Fleet	University of Washington, Oregon State University
IceCube Neutrino Observatory	University of Wisconsin
International Ocean Discovery Program	Texas A&M, University of California-San Diego (Scripps Institution of Oceanography)
Leadership-Class Computing Facility	University of Texas, Austin
Large Hadron Collider	SUNY Stony Brook, Columbia University, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Cornell University
Laser Interferometer Gravitational-wave Observatory	California Institute of Technology
National High Magnetic Field Lab	Florida State University

JASON Report on Facilities Cybersecurity

- 7 recommendations on risk assessment, strategy coordination, annual reviews, incident response, resourcing, planning, and national security:
https://www.nsf.gov/news/special_reports/jasonreportcybersecurity/
- Trusted CI support, aligned with the Framework:
<https://trustedci.org/2022-jason-report>
- New NSF Cybersecurity Advisor for Research Infrastructure
<https://beta.nsf.gov/careers/openings/od/od/od-2022-87834>

NSF Science and Compliance

While many cybersecurity compliance programs exist (e.g. HIPAA, FISMA, NIST 800-171), most NSF research (e.g. astronomy, climate, physics, geology) do not fall under a compliance program.



Gemini South on the summit of Cerro Pachón in Chile (left) and Gemini North on the summit of Maunakea in Hawai'i (right).

Image credit: Gemini/NSF/AURA

NSF Cybersecurity Governance

NSF does not prescribe cybersecurity - it is the responsibility of the awardee.



*"NSF's responsibility is for overseeing the Recipient's development and management of the facility as well as assuring the successful performance of the funded activities. **The Recipient is responsible for the day-to-day management of the facility.**"*

NSF Research Infrastructure Guide (NSF 21-107), December 2021. Emphasis from source document.

The Value of the NSF Approach

NSF's approach allows NSF projects the flexibility to shape their cybersecurity program to best support their science mission.



Cybersecurity supports organizational mission

Organizational mission translates into different priorities for cybersecurity.

Imagine the program for a bank and hospital – confidentiality, availability, Integrity, resilience, etc. are all prioritized differently.



The Trusted CI Framework

The Trusted CI Framework establishes **best cybersecurity practices** for cybersecurity programs.

- 16 clear and concise requirements.
- Based on best practices and evidence of what works.
- Designed to be universal and timeless.

It focuses on cybersecurity programmatic:

Mission Alignment, **Governance**, **Resources**, and **Controls**.

This goes beyond technical controls to address the full spectrum of cybersecurity best practices.



<https://www.trustedci.org/framework>

Framework Implementation Guide for Research Cyberinfrastructure Operators



The guide gives research organizations a community-tailored head start on choosing among good paths and avoiding treacherous ones.

Includes:

- roadmaps for establishing mature cybersecurity programs
- tailored advice on overcoming common challenges
- pointers to resources, including our publicly available tools and templates

Built by Trusted CI's experienced multi-institutional team, and vetted by a **Framework Advisory Board** representing the diversity of our community.

<https://www.trustedci.org/framework>



Framework Adopters

Example Framework Adopters:

- FABRIC
- GAGE
- LIGO
- NOIRLab
- NRAO
- NSO
- OOI
- ResearchSOC



GAGE



<https://www.trustedci.org/framework>

Growing Ransomware Risk to Science

Ransomware has changed the cybercrime landscape, broadly expanding potential victims to include hospitals, schools, cities, and researchers.

Trusted CI Collaboration with Michigan State University office of the CIO to document impact of ransomware attack on research.

Report available at:

hdl.handle.net/2022/26638



Research at Risk:
Ransomware Attack on Physics and Astronomy Case Study

Aug 1, 2021

Distribution: Public

Authors: Andrew Adams¹, Tom Siu, Julie Songer, Von Welch

¹ Engagement Lead, Andrew Adams

Science Gateways Security

September 2013: "Science Gateway Security Recommendations" at the Science Gateway Institute Workshop in Indianapolis

Partnership with Science Gateways Community Institute (SGCI) since 2016

Participation at Gateways conference and SGCI Focus Weeks

Engagements with ChemCOMpute, COIN-OR, COSMIC2, CyberGIS, Data@Risk, EarthCube, Galaxy, GenAPP, GISandbox, Hydroshare, Ike Wai, I-TASSER, SciGaP, SeedMeLab

September 2021: "Recommendations For Improving the Security of a Science Gateway"



Science Gateways
Community Institute



Recommendations For Improving the Security of a Science Gateway



ed cybersecurity time and funding
takeaways to empower science

research, [Trusted CI](#) has partnered with
security expertise for high-powered
gh this partnership we have worked
ersecurity challenges. The following
ence gateway community and are
y a typical small science gateway team.

[Framework Must\(s\)](#) most relevant to the
lance related to the Musts, science
[Implementation Guide for Research](#)

<https://trustedci.org/sciencegateways>

s, exposing SSH to attackers. To ensure
practices; enable two-factor
utilize an automated blocking
ly authentication and disable password
algorithms; filter (when possible) known

[#2ban, CIS Controls #16](#)

service availability through the threat
to monitor the system and send issue
daily summary emails.
[controls #8](#)





Science DMZ Security

- Partnered with EPOC, University of Arkansas / DART project on Science DMZ focused engagement
- Created reusable template security documents related to Science DMZs
- Published Security of Science DMZ whitepaper
 - <https://hdl.handle.net/2022/27007>
 - Help senior leadership to understand security of Science DMZs
 - Summarize and expand on security recommendations
 - Provide links to more resources



Scientific OT



Scientific Support OT

Also:

Building HVAC


Cranes

Winches


Antenna controllers

Electronic door controls

Environmental monitoring




Two wind profiler radars (large white boxes) on the deck of the R/V Menai. One is a MRF and the other is a RAS. There is also a RAS and an S-band vertically pointing radar (the arm above).



OT Security Study Findings

- Security is a missing element for OT procurement requirements.
- Organizational “silos” between IT security personnel and OT operators.
- Some host institutions (e.g., universities) can help MFs with IT/OT security but even they may not have OT security expertise appropriate to instruments in MFs.
- Newer OT (acquired in the past five years) — is increasingly “software defined” — contains exactly the same vulnerabilities as traditional IT systems.



TRUSTED CI

THE NSF CYBERSECURITY
CENTER OF EXCELLENCE

Findings of the 2022 Trusted CI Study on the Security of Operational Technology in NSF Scientific Research

July 13, 2022

Status: Draft Report v1.0

Distribution: Public

Emily K. Adams, Daniel Gunter, Ryan Kiser, Mark Krenz, Sean Peisert,
Susan Sons, and John Zage

Staying Connected with Trusted CI

Trusted CI Webinars

4th Monday of month at 11am ET.

<https://trustedci.org/webinars>

Follow Us

<https://trustedci.org>

<https://blog.trustedci.org>

@TrustedCI 

Slack

Email ask@trustedci.org for an invitation.



Email Lists

Announce and Discuss

<https://trustedci.org/trustedci-email-lists>

Ask Us Anything

No question too big or too small.

info@trustedci.org

Cyberinfrastructure Vulnerabilities

Latest news on security vulnerabilities tailored for cyberinfrastructure community.

<https://trustedci.org/vulnerabilities/>

Acknowledgments

Trusted CI is supported by the National Science Foundation under Grants 1234408, 1547272, 1920430, and 2241313. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation or any other organization.



Trusted CI activities are made possible thanks to the contributions of a multi-institutional team:
<https://trustedci.org/who-we-are/>

